THE CLAWSOLATOR PRINCIPLEA prompt is not a permission system.Meet the independent daemonOperator authority belongs outside the agent.
OPEN ENGINEERING / LICENSES / SECURITY

Standards first.
Claims after proof.

Clawsolator is built on a reuse-first philosophy: Linux, rootless Podman, upstream agent tooling, and security practices informed by structured testing methods such as OSSTMM—not a claim of formal OSSTMM certification.

WHY THESE COMPONENTS

Every dependency must earn its place.

COMPONENTREASON TO USE ITLICENSE / CAUTION
Rootless PodmanExisting Linux container runtime with user namespaces and cgroup support; reduces reliance on root-running container daemons.Audit Podman’s upstream source and third-party terms before redistribution; rootless is not equivalent to harmless.
OpenClaw (optional)Useful plugins, agent interfaces, messaging connectors and an existing mobile ecosystem.OpenClaw project code is MIT; plugins and third-party dependencies may have separate terms.
NVIDIA OpenShell (candidate)Network, filesystem, process and credential policy primitives that need not be rewritten from scratch.OpenShell source identifies Apache-2.0; integration feasibility requires testing.
XMAN / ClawsolatorCustom bounded resource admission, policies, recovery, and human-facing operations for documented gaps.Final XERXES SI licensing has not yet been selected. A permissive community edition, paid commercial support, or a separately licensed enterprise layer are options to evaluate; none is announced.

SOURCE · OpenClaw repository / MIT · SOURCE · OpenShell Apache-2.0 metadata · SOURCE · Podman project

THE EVIDENCE LADDER

We separate “works” from “secure.”

A successful 32 MiB memory grant demonstrates one functioning integrated control path. It does not certify isolation, crash consistency or resistance to hostile agents.

01DocumentedThe relevant upstream behavior exists on paper.
02Host verifiedInstalled component and effective configuration checked.
03Agent provenThe actual model/tool path completes a task.
04Adversarially testedNegative cases, privilege boundaries and recovery exercised.
05Release qualifiedReproducible install, rollback and independent review.
RESPONSIBLE SECURITY CLAIMS

What we refuse to pretend.

ROOT BOUNDARY

A design is not a shipped daemon.

The optional root-owned privileged executor, signed one-use grants and strong human-authentication flow remain planned work.

INDEPENDENCE

No unsupported “only one” claim.

OpenShell, NemoClaw and others have serious security features. XMAN’s end-to-end workflow needs comparative tests.

TESTING

OSSTMM is an influence, not a badge.

We emphasize measurable scope, attack surfaces, repeatable test procedures and evidence. No certification is asserted.

THE NEXT STEP

A serious engineering conversation starts with mechanisms.

Bring a machine, workload, test plan and acceptance criteria.

ENGINEERING & LICENSING

Borrow sound foundations. Verify our own additions.

PROVEN FOUNDATIONS

Rootless Podman

Linux namespaces, capability restriction and unprivileged containers are preferred to handing an agent a host-level container socket. Rootless reduces but does not eliminate host risk.

COMMUNITY & COMPATIBILITY

Open components

Use mature framework components where they help. Record versions, licenses, dependencies and security changes; do not imply community approval or certification.

ENTERPRISE DISCLOSURE

Licenses and rights

GPLv2 and other license choices must be evaluated per component. Publication rights, compatible dependencies, contribution rules and redistribution must be documented before a public release.

OSSTMM and continuous-improvement thinking inform the engineering philosophy; they are not certification or proof of compliance.