XMAN manager daemon: current Alpha
Owns bounded resource admission, durable requests, scheduler decisions, scoped approvals and the limited Podman adapter.
Operations and security are different responsibilities. Their daemons should remain separate from one another and from XMAN’s operator authority.
PLANNED COMPONENT
The SysOp is envisioned as an operations specialist with its own rootless daemon, narrowly scoped to health checks, status inspection and proposed maintenance actions. The SysOp would not acquire XMAN operator credentials merely because it identifies a problem. Operator approval and XMAN policy still decide whether a privileged host action is authorized.
Status: roadmap only. No completed daemon API, release date, production monitoring coverage, automated repair success rate or independent security qualification is claimed.
ROLE SEPARATION
Owns bounded resource admission, durable requests, scheduler decisions, scoped approvals and the limited Podman adapter.
Owns a limited operations and health-observation scope under separate credentials and service lifecycle, with no unilateral host privilege escalation.
Owns a separate future security analysis scope, such as plugin preflight checks and runtime incident evidence; potential containment requires explicit grants and safety tests.
ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS
All integrations should use a documented API contract with authenticated identity, narrowly scoped methods, idempotency, generation-bound targets, explicit authorization and correlated receipts. Events should be treated as untrusted observations until independently verified. No model-generated string can be construed as a human approval.
The SysOp’s repair proposal should be inspectable before execution; the Security Officer’s incident reports should distinguish suspicion, authorization, action attempted and verified outcome. A false positive should have an operator-controlled recovery path.
TRANSPARENT LIMITS
It is not a claim that Clawsolator already prevents every prompt injection or malicious plugin, and it is not a general-purpose OS-root watchdog. The future daemons must be designed, threat-modeled, tested and independently qualified. We respect the OSSTMM testing methodology without claiming certification.