Podman image load permissions
OpenClaw Podman setup reportedly wrote a temp tar that the target runtime user could not read.
Exact upstream bug fix by Clawsolator is not established.
Read the primary sourceAn installer reporting success is not the same as a running, healthy Gateway. Permissions, SELinux labels, persistence and ownership must agree.
Historical source reports · XMAN alpha policy manager · Not a rewrite of Podman
OpenClaw Podman setup reportedly wrote a temp tar that the target runtime user could not read.
Exact upstream bug fix by Clawsolator is not established.
Read the primary sourceUser reported config read failure after setup claimed a container was started.
No claim XMAN patches that specific upstream code path.
Read the primary sourceUser described :Z SELinux mount labeling omission leading to EACCES even when ownership was correct.
Official Podman docs now describe SELinux-aware mount flags.
Read the primary sourceOne report described a temporary image archive created under an inaccessible owner-private directory. Another showed a claimed successful launch followed by an unreadable config file and no running container. A third traced EACCES to SELinux mount labels rather than traditional Unix ownership.
The operational lesson is that every setup stage needs a distinct result: prerequisites observed, image available, runtime ownership correct, service running, Gateway ready, and access route verified.
XMAN v0.4.76a1 uses a bounded typed Podman adapter, private requester/operator APIs and durable manager decisions. This is a useful governance model for enrolled containers, but rootless isolation alone is not a complete security boundary. XClaw supports diagnosis and guarded setup; exact production distribution/host behavior still needs version-specific qualification.